Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2000

Utah v. Kension : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Kenneth A. Bronston; Jan Graham; Earnest W. Jones.
Walter F. Bugden, Tara L. Issacson; Bugden, Collins, Morton; attorneys for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Kension, No. 20000152 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2645

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
Case No. 2000152-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Priority No. 2

JACOB LYMAN KENISON,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR TWO COUNTS OF CRIMINAL
MISCHIEF, THIRD DEGREE FELONIES, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-6-106 (1999), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE
HONORABLE WILLIAM H. BARRETT, PRESIDING.

KENNETH A. BRONSTON (4470)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Fl.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
WALTER F.BUGDEN
TARA L. ISSACSON
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON
623 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

EARNEST W. JONES
Deputy Salt Lake County
District Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorneys for Appellant

Attorneys for Appellee C11 C r \
Utah Court of AiMMMte

JUL 1 0 ™n0
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Julia

D'Alesandro

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 2000152-CA

v.
JACOB LYMAN KENISON,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR TWO COUNTS OF CRIMINAL
MISCHIEF, THIRD DEGREE FELONIES, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-6-106 (1999), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE
HONORABLE WILLIAM H. BARRETT, PRESIDING.

KENNETH A. BRONSTON (4470)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Fl.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
WALTER F.BUGDEN
TARA L. ISSACSON
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON
623 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

EARNEST W. JONES
Deputy Salt Lake County
District Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorneys for Appellant

Attorneys for Appellee

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Ill

T1R1F

OF AUTHORITIES

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT

6
S T O R E D THE STATUTORY

B^SKSE,. ..
APPLY TO HIM
A.

^ i a t u r e ' s Deliberate
ta

n . Ru,e of unity, * w * £ £ i*» * * f »
Penalty For
Xnadvertent Error.

toisCenerMM^ZTole
Tne Rule of^^Ztura®
As*****
ueisUttive Enactments am
^cious ana Deliberate

\

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Because the Floor r>au

CONCLUSION

NoiRece'l
J.™*4 demeanor
'Ve "* *** of,He RuTo}^""

ntComm,^dby
**"
11

ADDENDA

17

Addendum A - Utah rv^ .
ua
* Code Ann. , y ^ . ,
Addenda B - T
Add

^ ' ^ icemen,

^ ^ S r u S ^ o n H . B . 4 ,
^C-TranscriptofSe
" " ^ " - M * ^

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 113 S. Ct. 838(1993)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984)

14, 15, 17
15

STATE CASES
Belt v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 230, 279 P.2d 791,
aff'donreh'g, 25 Utah 380, 483 P.2d 45 (1971)

8,9,10, 11, 16

Inre Estrada, 408 P. 2d 948 (Cal. 1965)

10

State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856 (Utah 1995)

1

State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381 (UtahApp. 1997)
State v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347 (Utah 1997)
State v. Saxton, 30 Utah 456, 519 P.2d 1340 (1974)
State v. Tapp, 26 Utah 2d 392, 490 P.2d 333, 336 (Utah 1971)
State v. Yates, 918 P.2d 136 (UtahApp. 1996)

7,8
2, 12
9
8, 10, 11, 16
9, 10

STATE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-102(1999)

10

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-103 (1999)

9, 10, 16

Utah Code Ann. §76-6-106(1999)

1,2

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (Supp. 1997)

3,4, 11, 12, 15
iii

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1996)

1

UtahR. App. P. 11

12
OTHER AUTHORITIES

WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1672 (College Ed. 1957)

iv

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

JACOB LYMAN KENISON,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 2000152-CA

Priority No. 2

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for two counts of criminal mischief, third
degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (1999), in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable William H.
Barrett, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-2a-3(2)(e)(1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The sole issue in this case is:
Did the trial court correctly deny defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (1999)? A trial court's interpretation of a statute is
reviewed for correctness with no deference accorded to the trial court's conclusions of
law. State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 859 (Utah 1995). "This court will 'sustain a trial
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court's evidentiary ruling on any available ground, even though it may be one not
advanced below.'" State v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347, 1353 (Utah 1997) (citation omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
The recent reenactments to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (1999), determinative of
the issue in this case, are attached at Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Jacob Lyman Kenison, was charged with two counts of criminal
mischief (Counts I and II), two counts of burglary (Counts III and IV), and two counts of
release of fur-bearing animals (Counts V and VI) [R. 14-16]. He pled guilty to Counts I
and II, and the remaining charges were dismissed [R. 35-32]. The trial court sentenced
defendant to concurrent statutory zero-to-five year terms in the Utah State Prison [R. 4446]. The court suspended defendant's commitment to prison and instead ordered
defendant confined and imprisoned in the Salt Lake County Jail for nine months, after
which defendant was to be placed on probation for thirty-six months [R. 5,44-46].
When defendant completed the required credits for his high school diploma, the court
ordered his releasefromjail [R. 7, 65]. However, when defendant violated the reporting
requirements of his probation, it was revoked and he was committed to the Utah State
Prison [R. 7,79-80]. Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence [R. 83-87].
The motion was denied [R. 135-6]. Defendant timely appealed to this Court [R. 137].

2
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Factual Background - Defendant Committed Criminal Mischief
On or about June 22, 1996, defendant trespassed onto the Beckstead Mink farm,
belonging to Lee Beckstead and Craig Thompson, and released mink [R. 15, 36]. Also,
on or about July 17, 1996, defendant trespassed onto the Holt Mink farm, belonging to
Ryan Holt, and released mink [R. 16, 36]. The two farms sustained $200,000 in damage
from the release of the mink and from vandalism to the farm [R. 16].
The Procedural Background - The Relevant Portion of the Statute,
Applicable Both When Defendant Committed Criminal Mischief
And When He Moved to Correct His Sentence, Made the Offense
a Third Degree Felony.
Prior to May 4, 1998, and in force at the time of the offense, Utah Code Ann. § 766-106 (l)(c) (Supp. 1997), provided that "[a] person commits criminal mischief if the
person . . . intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the property of another." Under
subsection (2)(c)(i) of the pre-1998 statute, a violation of subsection (l)(c) was a "felony
of the second degree if the actor's conduct causes or is intended to cause pecuniary loss
equal to or in excess of $5,000 in value." Under subsection (2)(c)(ii), a violation of
subsection (l)(c) was a "felony of the third degree if [it] causes or is intended to cause
pecuniary loss equal to or in excess of $1,000 but is less than $5,000 in value."
Effective May 4,1998, section 76-6-106 was amended at subsection (2)(b) to read,
"[a] violation of Subsection 1(b) or (c) is a class A misdemeanor" (emphasis added).
On May 11,1998, defendant was charged in a six count information with two
3
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counts of criminal mischief, both second degree felonies, in violation of section 76-6-106
[R. 14-16]. He was also charged with two counts of burglary and two counts of release of
fur-bearing animals [R. 15]. The information, in Count I (criminal mischief), stated that
defendant "intentionally damaged, defaced, or destroyed the property of Craig Thompson
and Lee Beckstead, causing a pecuniary loss . . . equal to or in excess of $5,000 in value"
[R. 14]. Count II (criminal mischief) stated that defendant "intentionally damaged,
defaced, or destroyed the property of Ryan Holt, causing a pecuniary loss . . . equal to or
in excess of $5,000 in value." [R. 14].
On October 28, 1998, defendant pled guilty to amended Counts I and II, as third
degree felonies [R. 35]. The information was accordingly amended to read "causing a
pecuniary loss . . . in excess of $1,000 but less than $5000." [R. 14]. The State agreed to
dismiss the other charges [R. 38].
On December 7,1998, defendant was ordered to serve not more than five years in
the Utah State Prison on each Count. The court suspended defendant's commitment to
the Prison and instead ordered defendant confined and imprisoned in the Salt Lake
County Jail for nine months, after which defendant was to be placed on probation for
thirty-six months [R. 5,44-46].
Effective May 3,1999, the legislature excised the words "or (c)" from section 766-106 (2)(b), thereby restoring the statute to precisely the same meaning it had on the date
of the offense.
4
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On January 18, 2000, the court found that defendant had violated the terms of his
probation and re-sentenced him to an indeterminate term not to exceed five years, on both
counts [R. 79-80].
On January 20, 2000, defendant submitted a motion to correct an illegal sentence
[R. 83]. Defendant asserted that "at the time the defendant was charged, the legislature
had made the crime of criminal mischief a misdemeanor... regardless of value," and that
based on the rule of lenity "his . . . convictions [should be] recorded as Class A
Misdemeanors and the sentences imposed by this Court should be amended." [R. 83-87].
On February 9,2000, almost a year after the criminal mischief statute had been
restored to its pre-offense form, the court denied defendant's motion [R. 135-36].
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant is not entitled to the benefit of the rule of lenity and to have his sentence
for criminal mischief imposed as a class A misdemeanor rather than a third degree felony.
Based on the reasonable assumption that statutory amendments reflect the legislature's
deliberate intent, the rule justly directs a trial court to impose a lesser penalty if the
amendment has become effective before a defendant is sentenced. However, the rule of
lenity is based on the legislature's deliberate decision to reduce the penalty of an offense.
The legislature apparently did reduce the penalty associated with the form of
criminal mischief defendant committed from a third degree felony to a class A
misdemeanor in 1998, before he was sentenced. However, prior to defendant's moving to
5
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correct his sentence, the legislature reamended the criminal mischief statute in 1999,
clarifying that the offense was a second degree felony. In so doing, the legislature
expressly acknowledged that the 1998 amendment was a typographic computer error and
that the legislature never intended to reduce the type of criminal mischief defendant
committed to a class A misdemeanor. Because the legislature never intended the apparent
reduction in penalty, the rule of lenity does not apply in the unique circumstances of this
case. Consequently, allowing defendant to receive a lesser penalty for an offense the
legislature deemed a third degree felony, both at the time he committed the offense and
when he moved the court to correct his sentence, would result in an unwarranted windfall
for defendant.
ARGUMENT
BECAUSE THE LEGISLATURE RESTORED THE STATUTORY
PENALTY FOR CRIMINAL MISCHIEF TO A THIRD DEGREE
FELONY PRIOR TO THE TIME DEFENDANT MOVED TO
CORRECT HIS SENTENCE, THE RULE OF LENITY DOES NOT
APPLY TO HIM
Defendant claims that because at the time he was charged and sentenced criminal
mischief was a class A misdemeanor, rather than a third degree felony as the statute
formerly provided, he should have received the lesser sentence under the rule of lenity.
Aplt.Br. 5-11.
This argument would be unassailable if the legislature had not expressly
recognized that reducing the particular form of criminal mischief applicable to defendant
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to a class A misdemeanor was simply a computer error. In consequence, before
defendant moved to correct the illegal sentence, the legislature cured the error by
reenacting the statutory language precisely as it had been before defendant was charged
and sentenced. Because the progressive policy underlying the rule of lenity is founded on
the reasonable assumption that statutes reflect the deliberate intent of the legislature, that
rule has no application in the circumstances of this case. Therefore, the imposition of a
zero-to-five term for defendant's plea to a third degree felony should be upheld.
A. The Rule of Lenity, Founded on the Legislature's Deliberate
Action, Does Not Apply Because the 1998 Reduction in Penalty
For Criminal Mischief Statute was Merely an Inadvertent Error.
/.

The Rule of Lenity is Generally Applicable Because Legislative
Enactments and Naturally Assumed to be Conscious and Deliberate.

Relying on the rule of lenity, defendant argues that he was entitled to a class A
misdemeanor sentence apparently in effect at the time of sentencing, rather than the third
degree felony sentence in effect at the time he committed criminal mischief. Aplt's Br. at
5-11. As defendant notes, see Aplt's Br. at 6-11, Utah's appellate courts have repeatedly
applied the rule of lenity, recognizing that, in appropriate circumstances, criminal
defendants "'are entitled to the benefit of the lesser penalty afforded by an amended
statute made effective prior to their sentencing.'" State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 385
(Utah App. 1997). Explaining the rationale for the rule, this Court stated:
A legislative mitigation of the penalty for a particular crime represents a
legislative judgment that the lesser penalty or the different treatment is
sufficient to meet the legitimate ends of the criminal law. Nothing is to be
7
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gained by imposing the more severe penalty after such a pronouncement;
the excess in punishment can, by hypothesis, serve no purpose other than to
satisfy a desire for vengeance.
Id. (quoting Belt v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 230, 279 P.2d 791, 793, ajfdon reh'g, 25 Utah
380,483 P.2d 45 (1971)) (emphasis added). Thus, the most important policy behind the
rule "'is that it is the prerogative of the legislature, expressing the will of the people, to
fix the penalties for crimes; and the courts should give effect to the enactment and the
effective date thereof as so declared.'" Id. (quoting State v. Tapp, 26 Utah 2d 392, 490
P.2d 333, 336 (Utah 1971)) (emphasis added). Accordingly, in both Patience and Tapp,
in which the penalties for the offenses at the time of commission were reduced prior to
the defendants' sentencing, the appellate courts found that the lesser punishments should
have been imposed. See Aplt's Br. at 9-11 (citing Tapp, 490 P.2d at 135-36; Patience,
944P.2dat388).
However, decisions applying the rule of lenity are based on the natural and
reasonable assumption that legislative enactments are the fruit of conscious and deliberate
consideration. The above-quoted languagefromPatience, 944 P.2d at 385 ("A
legislative mitigation of the penalty for a particular crime represents a legislative
judgment

"), and Tapp, 490 P.2d at 336 ("expressing the will of the people"),

supports this obvious assumption.1 Other decisions, relied on by both Patience and Tapp,

1

See WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1672 (College Ed. 1957) (defining
"will" as "the power of conscious and deliberate action or choice").
8
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are even more explicit in recognizing the dependency of the rule on deliberate legislative
action. In State v. Yates, 918 P.2d 136 (Utah App. 1996), this Court repeatedly
acknowledged the purposiveness of legislative action in applying the rule of lenity:
"A new policy having been adopted by the legislature concerning the
punishment for the offense we are here concerned with . . . should inure to
the defendant's benefit even though the offense had been committed . . .
prior to the amendatory legislation." [Emphasis added.]
"The rationale underlying the rule . . . was set forth in Belt
Second, if the legislaturefindsa reduction in the penalty for a given crime
necessary and appropriate to meet the goals of deterrence, rehabilitation,
and removal from society, then the lesser penalty should be granted to all
defendants sentenced subsequent to modification." [Emphasis added.]
Id. at 138-39 (quoting Belt, 479 P.2d at 792-93).2 The Court in Yates, also stated:
2

Defendant also argues that his claim is supported by Utah Code Ann. § 76-1103 (1999). Aplt's Br. at 9. That section states:
(1) The provisions of this code shall govern the construction of, the
punishment for, and defenses against any offense defined in this code or,
except where otherwise specifically provided or the context otherwise
requires, any offense defined outside this code; provided such offense was
committed after the effective date of this code.
(2) Any offense committed prior to the effective date of this code shall be
governed by the law, statutory and non-statutory, existing at the time of
commission thereof, except that a defense or limitation on punishment
available under this code shall be available to any defendant tried or
retried after the effective date. An offense under the laws of this state
shall be deemed to have been committed prior to the effective date of this
act if any of the elements of the offense occurred prior thereto.
In support, defendant relies solely on State v. Saxton, 30 Utah 456, 519 P.2d
1340 (1974). However, in the Utah Supreme Court in Saxton applied section 76-1-103
because the defendant correctly recognized that the pre-Code penalty for his offense, a
third degree felony, had been superceded by the 1973 Code, which made his offense a
9
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"In the case of the . . . statute involved here, the legislature decided it was
time to revise the . . . law. Legislative history reveals the amendments
were necessary
Thus, the legislature found a reduction in penalties
appropriate, and the trial court should have sentenced [defendant] pursuant
to that legislative mandate" [Emphasis added.]
Id. at 139 (citing tape of House Floor Debates). See also Belt, 479 P.2d at 792 ("As to a
mitigation of penalties, then, it is safe to assume, as the modern rule does, that it was the
legislative design that the lighter penalty should be imposed in all cases that subsequently
reach the courts;') (emphasis added). In In re Estrada, 408 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1965), the
California Supreme Court stated:
The problem . . . is . . . trying to ascertain the legislative intent did
[sic] the [legislature intend the old or new statute to apply?
. . . When the Legislature amends a statute so as to lessen the punishment it
has obviously expressly determined that its former penalty was too severe
and that a lighter punishment is proper
It is an inevitable inference
that the Legislature must have intended that the new statute imposing the
lighter penalty... should apply. [Emphasis added.]

class A misdemeanor at the time of sentencing. Id. at 1342. See Utah Code Ann. §
76-1-102 (1999) (the effective date of the Utah Criminal Code is July 1, 1973). Since
defendant in this case did not commit the offense prior to the effective date of the Code,
section 76-1-103 is irrelevant here. The State recognizes that this Court does apply
section 76-1-103 in support of its application of the rule of lenity in Yates. See Yates,
918 P.2d at 138. No post-1973 case involving the rule of lenity, other than Yates, has
applied section 76-1-103. Moreoever, in view of the plain language of section 76-1103, the State contends that section 76-1-103 is not applicable in such a case.
Moreover, even if section 76-1-103 were relevant, Saxton's application of the statute is
still rooted in the rationale of Belt and Tapp. Id. at 1342 ("The 'non-statutory' law
'existing at the time of commission' [referred to in section 76-1-103(2)] of this crime
included the rule [of Belt and Tapp] stated above: that if the penalty for a crime is reduced
before sentence, the defendant is entitled to the lesser penalty.").

10
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Id. at 951 (cited with approval in Belt, 479 P.2d at 793 n.l; Tapp, 490 P.2d at 336 n.3, 5).
In sum, the Utah rule of lenity is plainly based only on the assumption that changes in the
law reflect conscious legislative action.
2.

Because the Floor Debates on the Amendments to Section 76-6-106
Show that the Legislature Never Intended to Reduce the Form of Criminal
Mischief Committed by Defendant to a Class A Misdemeanor, Defendant
Should Not Receive the Benefit of the Rule of Lenity.

Application of the rule in this case would undermine the very rationale behind it.
Defendant here committed criminal mischief in June and July of 1996. At that time, Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (l)(c) (Supp. 1997), provided that "[a] person commits criminal
mischief if the person . . . intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the property of
another" (pre-1998 statute attached at Addendum A).3 Under subsection (2)(c)(ii), a
violation of subsection (l)(c) was a "felony of the third degree if [it] causes or is intended
to cause pecuniary loss equal to or in excess of $1,000 but is less than $5,000 in value."
Effective May 4, 1998, section 76-6-106, was amended at subsection (2)(b) to read
"[a] violation of Subsection 1(b) or (e) is a class A misdemeanor" (emphasis added)

3

Specifically, the pre-1998 statute and all of its successor reenactments identify
four general ways in which criminal mischief may be committed at subsections (l)(a)
(destruction of property to defraud an insurer), (l)(b) (tampering with property which
thereby endangers human life or impairs public utility service), (l)(c) (intentional
damage, defacement, or destruction of another's property), and (l)(d) (shooting at a
cars, boats, trains, etc.). Subsection (2)(a) provides that a violation of subsection (l)(a) is
a third degree felony; subsection (2)(b) provides that a violation of subsection (l)(b) is a
class A misdemeanor. Thereafter, subsection (2)(c) provides: "Any other violation of
this section is a [second or third degree felony, or a class A or B misdemeanor, depending
on the amount of pecuniary loss]." [Emphasis added.]

11
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(attached at Addendum A).4 The amendment, along with other changes in the statute,
was contained in House Bill 49. The second and third reading of the bill show that the
changes to the existing law were not discussed (Transcript of Floor Debates, attached at
Addendum B).
On May 11, 1998, defendant was charged with, among other offenses, two counts
of criminal mischief, "second degree felonies," in violation of section 76-6-106, for
having "intentionally damaged, defaced, or destroyed the property [of others]

" [R.

14-16].
On October 28, 1998, defendant pled guilty to the two counts of criminal mischief,
reduced to third degree felonies [R. 35]. Thus, all parties and the trial court agreed to a
4

Thus, under amended subsection (2)(b), all violations of subsection (l)(c) were
penalized as class A misdemeanors and were no longer related to the extent of pecuniary
damage caused by the actor. The hearing on defendant's motion to correct an illegal
sentence reveals that the trial court considered the pecuniary damage caused by defendant
in denying the motion. In contravention of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, defendant
has failed to make either the videotape or a transcript of the hearing part of the record on
appeal. Rule 11, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides:
If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is
unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in
the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to suchfindingor conclusion.
Neither the court nor the appellee is obligated to correct appellant's
deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the transcript.
Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2). However, because the State urges a different reason for
affirming defendant's sentence, defendant's failure to bring up the record is not crucial to
his appeal. See Pearson, 943 P.2d at 1353 ("This court will 'sustain a trial court's
evidentiary ruling on any available ground, even though it may be one not advanced
below.t,f (quoting State v. RimmascK 775 P.2d 388,400 (Utah 1989)).
12
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plea, evidently unaware of the 1998 amendment. On December 7, 1998, in accord with
the plea, the court sentenced defendant to a zero-to-five year term of imprisonment, part
of which was stayed pursuant to a probation order [R. 5,44-46].
However, effective May 3, 1999, the legislature excised the words "or (c)" from
section 76-6-106 (2)(b), thereby restoring the statute to precisely the same meaning it had
on the date of the offense (current statute at Addendum A). Thus, criminal mischief
statute again penalized "intentionally damaging], defac[ing], or destroying] the property
of another" by reference to the pecuniary damage done by the actor. This again made
"intentionally damaging], defacjmg], or destroy[ing] the property of another" a third
degree felony, if it caused or was intended to cause pecuniary loss between $1,000 and
$5,000.
Unlike the 1998 amendment, the floor debates to the 1999 amendment plainly
reveal that adding "or (c)" to subsection (2)(b), presumably making defendant's form of
criminal mischief a class A misdemeanor, was a simple typographic error. The 1999
amendment was contained in House Bill 15 (Transcript of Floor Debates attached at
Addendum C). On the second reading of the bill, its sponsor, Bryan Holladay, stated:
This is a very simple correction of a bill we worked on last year. No one
knows for sure [inaudible] bill was placed back in for writing. Apparently
there was a change [inaudible] on page two, line twenty-eight, violation of
subsection (l)(b), and then "or (c)" was put in there. That takes that away
from being a more serious offense and being able to assess the dollar
amount shown on the handout that I've given you. We don't really know
where this took place and so we think we can effectively blame the
computers. It was never designed this way and the original law was not
13
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set up this way. [Emphasis added.]
53rd Leg., H.B. 15, second reading, Jan. 19, 1999.
The third reading of the bill again acknowledges the inadvertent, typographic
mistake in the 1998 amendment and its correction in the 1999 amendment (attached at
Addendum C).
On January 20, 2000, almost a year after the legislature clarified that defendant's
offenses were third degree felonies, defendant submitted a motion to correct an illegal
sentence, which the trial court denied [R. 83, 135-36].
Thus, unlike the typical case in which a statutory amendment actually represents
the intent of the legislature, the 1998 amendment is plainly an anomalous mistake.
Moreover, it was a mistake at the time of defendant's sentencing, even though proof of
that fact may have been difficult at that time. However, at this point in time, there is no
question that the 1998 amendment was a mistake, and defendant should not be permitted
to take advantage of a judicial rule that is plainly based on a rationale that has no
application in the circumstances of this case.
The rapid correction of a statute admittedly contrary to legislative intent is so
unusual that the State has been unable to find any case with similar facts. However, in an
analogous situation the United States Supreme Court recognized that allowing a
defendant to take advantage of law that no longer applied to his case would result in an
unwarranted "windfall." See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364,113 S. Ct. 838, 841
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(1993).
In Fretwell, the defendant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death
based on the jury's finding the aggravating factor that the murder, which occurred during
a robbery, was committed for pecuniary gain. Id. 113 S. Ct. at 841. After failing in his
direct appeal and state post-conviction proceedings, the defendant claimed on federal
habeas corpus that his counsel was ineffective in failing to raise an objection under thenexisting precedent which prohibited the use of an aggravating factor which duplicated an
element of the underlying offense, and the federal court of appeals upheld the reversal of
his sentence. Id. at 841.
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, disregarding its finding that if
trial counsel made the objection the trial court would have sustained it and the jury would
not have sentenced the defendant to death. Id. at 842. Considering the prejudice prong of
defendant's ineffective assistance claim under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, (1984), the Court held a defendant must show that his
counsel's errors are so serious as to deprive him of a trial whose result is fair or reliable,
i.e., deprivation of a substantive or procedural right, not merely that the outcome would
have been different. Id. The Court held that the defendant was not deprived of such right
because at the time the federal court of appeals heard his petition, the precedent forming
the basis of his ineffective assistance claim had been overruled. Id. at 842-44. Most
significantly, the Court rejected the defendant's claim that "prejudice," as opposed to
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deficient performance, should be determined at the time of trial, see id at 844, holding
instead that prejudice is established at the time at which the ineffective assistance of
counsel claim was heard. Id. at 845 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Specifically, today we
hold that the court making the prejudice determination may not consider the effect of an
objection it knows to be wholly meritless under current governing law, even if the
objection might have been considered meritorious at the time of its omission.").
Therefore, where the result in the sentencing proceeding was not unreliable or
fundamentally unfair as a result of a failure to make an objection, granting a reversal of
the sentence would result in a "windfall" to which the defendant was not entitled. Id. at
841,843.
Similarly, a defendant's notice to a trial court that a statute reducing the penalty of
his offense at the time of sentencing should result in his being sentenced under the more
lenient statute. See Belt, 479 P.2d at 793. However, when the objection, i.e., the motion
to correct an illegal sentence, is made under a statute that no longer applies and is in
direct contradiction to the intent of the current statute, defendant is not prejudiced when
that motion is denied. Rather, defendant would reap a "windfall" if he received the
benefit of a mistaken law under a rule whose rationale did not apply to his case.
The rule of lenity is a matter of mercy, not a matter of right accorded by statute.5
See Tapp, 490 P.2d at 336 ("[A fundamental principle engrained in the law] is that to
5

See discussion of inapplicability of section 76-1-103, supra note 2
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insist on the prior existing harsher penalty is a refusal to accept and keep abreast of the
process which has been continuing over the years of ameliorating and modifying the
treatment of antisocial behavior by changing the emphasis from vengeance and
punishment to treatment and rehabilitation/') (footnotes omitted). In accord with the
analysis applied in Fretwell, and given that the circumstances of defendant's case do not
naturally appeal to a reasonable person's sense of justice and mercy, this Court should
find that the rule of lenity does not apply in the unique circumstances of this case and that
the trial court correctly denied defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that defendant's
conviction be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /<?

day of July, 2000.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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76-6-105

UTAH CRIMINAL CODE

(1999)

76-6-106. Criminal mischief.
(1) A person commits criminal mischief if the person:
(a) under circumstances not amounting to arson, damages or destroys
property with the intention of defrauding an insurer;
(b) intentionally and unlawfully tampers with the property of another
and as a result:
(i) recklessly endangers:
(A) human life; or
(B) human health or safety; or
(ii) recklessly causes or threatens a substantial interruption or
impairment of:
(A) any public utility service; or
(B) any service or facility that provides communication with
any public, private, or volunteer entity whose purpose is to
respond tofire,police, or medical emergencies;
(c) intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the property of another;
or
(d) recklessly or willfully shoots or propels a missile or other object at or
against a motor vehicle, bus, airplane, boat, locomotive, train, railway car,
or caboose, whether moving or standing.
(2) (a) A violation of Subsection (IXa) is a felony of the third degree.
(b) A violation of Subsection (1Kb) is a class A misdemeanor, except that
a violation of Subsection (lXbXiXB) is a class B misdemeanor.
(c) Any other violation of this section is a:
(i) felony of the second degree if the actor's conduct causes or is
intended to cause pecuniary loss equal to or in excess of $5,000 in
value;
(ii) felony of the third degree if the actor's conduct causes or is
intended to cause pecuniary loss equal to or in excess of $1,000 but is
less than $5,000 in value;
(iii) class A misdemeanor if the actor's conduct causes or is intended to cause pecuniary loss equal to or in excess of $300 but is less
than $1,000 in value; and
(iv) class B misdemeanor if the actor's conduct causes or is intended to cause pecuniary loss leas than $300 in value.
(3) In determining the value of damages under this section, or for computer
crimes under Section 76-6-703, the value of any computer, computer network,
computer property, computer services, software, or data shall include the
measurable value of the loss of use of the items and the measurable cost to
replace or restore the items.
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Ch. 142

(ii) felony of the third degree if the actor's conduct
causes or is intended to cause pecuniary loss equal
to or in excess of $1,000 but is less than $5,000 in
value;

CHAPTER 142
H. B. 264
Passed February 27, 1996
Approved March 12, 1996
Effective April 29, 1996

(iii) class A misdemeanor if the actor's conduct
causes or is intended to cause pecuniary loss equal
to or in excess of $300 but is less than $1,000 in
value; and

GRAFFITI AMENDMENTS
Sponsor: Ron Bigelow

(iv) class B misdemeanor if the actor's conduct
causes or is intended to cause pecuniary loss less
than $300 in value.

AN ACT RELATING TO THE CRIMINAL
CODE; CREATING A NEW SECTION ON
GRAFFITI; INCLUDING LIABILITY FOR
REMOVAL COSTS OF GRAFFITI; AND
PROVIDING FOR THE VOLUNTARY
REMOVAL OF GRAFFITI BY THE
RESPONSIBLE PERSON.

Section 2. Section 76-6-107 is enacted to
read:
76-6-107. Graffiti defined — Penalties —
Removal costs — Reimbursement liability.

This act affects sections of Utah Code Annotated
1953 as follows:

(1) "Graffiti" means any form of unauthorized
printing, writing, spraying, scratching, affixing, or
inscribing on the property of another regardless of
the content or nature of the material used in the
commission of the act

AMENDS:
76-6-106, as last amended by Chapter 291, Laws of
Utah 1995
76-6-206, as last amended by Chapter 14, Laws of
Utah 1992
78-11-20, as last amended by Chapter 1, Laws of
Utah 1996
78-11-20.7, as last amended by Chapter 1, Laws of
Utah 1996

(2) "Victim* means the person or entity whose
property was defaced by the graffiti and bears the
expense for its removal
(3) Graffiti is a:
(a) second degree felony if the damage caused is in
excess of 15,000;

ENACTS:
76-6-107, Utah Code Annotated 1963
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:

(b) third degree felony if the damage caused is in
excess of $1,'

Section 1. Section 76-4-106 la amended to
read:

(c) class A misdemeanor if the damage caused is
equal to or in excess of 1300; and

76-6-106. Criminal miachiet

(d) class B misdemeanor if the damage caused is
less than $300.

(1) A person commits criminal mischief if the
person:

(4) Damages under Subsection (3) include
removal costs, repair costs, or replacement costs,
whichever is less.

(a) under circumstances not amounting to arson,
damages or destroys property with the intention of
defrauding an insurer,

(5) The court, upon conviction or adjudication,
shall order restitution to the victim in the amount of
removal, repair, or replacement costs.

(b) intentionally and unlawfully tampers with
the property of another and thereby:

(6) An additional amount of $1,000 in restitution
shall be added to removal costs if the graffiti is
positioned on an overpass or an underpass, requires
that traffic be interfered with in order to remove it,
or the entity responsible for the area in which the
clean-Hip is to take place must provide assistance in
order for the removal to take place safely.

(i) recklessly endangers human life; or
(ii) recklessly causes or threatens a substantial
interruption or impairment of any public utility
service;
(c) intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys
the property of another!, including the use ef graffiti
as defined in Subsection 78-11 20(2)]; or

(7) A person who voluntarily and at his own
expense, removes graffiti for which he l i
responsible may be credited for the removal costs
against restitution ordered by a court.

(d) recklessly or willfully shoots or propels a
missile or other object at or against a motor vehicle,
bus, airplane, boat, locomotive, train, railway car, or
caboose, whether moving or standing.

Section 3. Section 76-6-206 is amended to
read:

(2) (a) A violation of Subsection (IXa) is a felony of
the third degree.

76-6-206. Criminal trespass.

(b) A violation of Subsection (1Kb) is a class A
misdemeanor.

(1) For purposes of this section "enter" means
intrusion of the entire body.

(c) Any other violation of this section is a:

(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under
circumstances not amounting to burglary as
defined in Section 76-6-202, 76-6-203, or
76-6-204:

(i) felony of the second degree if the actor's
conduct causes or is intended to cause pecuniary
loss equal to or in excess of $5,000 in value;
445

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

General

- 1998

CHAPTER 25
H. B. 49
Passed February 11, 1998
Approved March 2, 1998
Effective May 4, 1998

(2) (a) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a felony of
the third degree.
(b) A violation of Subsection (1Kb) or (c) is a class
A misdemeanor, except that a violation of
Subsection (l)(b)(i)(B) is a class B misdemeanor.

EMERGENCY SERVICES AMENDMENTS

(c) Any other violation of this section is a:

Sponsor: Bryan D. Holladay
H ACT RELATING TO THE CRIMINAL
COVEl AMENDING THE O F F E N S E S O F
CRIMINAL MISCHIEF A N D EMERGENCY
TELEPHONE A B U S E AS THEY RELATE TO
^PORTING
OF
EMERGENCIES;
CHEATING THE O F F E N S E OF DAMAGING
0 H INTERRUPTING A COMMUNICATION
DEVICE
USED
TO
REPORT
AN
EMERGENCY;
AND
PROVIDING
CRIMINAL
PENALTIES
FOR THE
OFFENSE.

This act affects sections of Utah Code Annotated
1953 as follows:
AMENDS*
76-6-106, as last amended by Chapter 300, Laws of
Utah 1997
76*9-202, as enacted by Chapter 196, Laws of Utah
1973
ENACTS*
76-6-108, Utah Code Annotated 1953
gt U enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:
Section 1. Section 76-6-106 i* amended to
read*

(i) felony of the second degree if the actor's
conduct causes or is intended to cause pecuniary
loss equal to or in excess of $5,000 in value;
(ii) felony of the third degree if the actor's conduct
causes or is intended to cause pecuniary loss equal
to or in excess of $1,000 but is less than $5,000 in
value;
(in) class A misdemeanor if the actor's conduct
causes or is intended to cause pecuniary loss equal
to or in excess of $300 but is less than $1,000 in
value; and
(iv) class B misdemeanor if the actor's conduct
causes or is intended to cause pecuniary loss less
than $300 in value.
(3) In determining the value of damages under
this section, or for computer crimes under Section
76-6-703, the value of any computer, computer
network, computer property, computer services,
software, or data shall include the measurable
value of the lose of use of such items and the
measurable cost to replace or restore such items.
Section 2. Section 76-6-108 is enacted to
readi
76-6-10& Damage to or interruption of a
communication device.

76-6-106. Criminal mischief.

(1) As used in this section:

(1) A person commits criminal mischief if the
person:

(a) "Communication device" means any device,
including a telephone, cellular telephone,
computer, or radio, which may be used in an
attempt to summon police, fire, medical, or other
emergency aid.

(a) under circumstances not amounting to arson,
damages or destroys property with the intention of
defrauding an insurer,

(b) "Emergency means any situation in which;

(b) intentionally and unlawfully tampers with
the property of another and [thesebyi (i)] as a result:

(j) property or human health or safety is in
jeopardy; ana

(i) recklessly endangers:

(n) the prompt summoning of aid is essential to
the preservation of the property or human safety or
heaitju

(A) human life; or
(B) human health or safety, or

(2) A person is guilty of damage to or interruption
of a7communication device if the actor attemptsTo
prohibit or interrupt, or prohibits or interrupts,
another person's use of communication equipment
when the other person is attempting to summon
emergency aid or has communicated a desire To
summon emergency aid, and in the process the
actor.

(ii) recklessly causes or threatens a substantial
interruption or impairment of:
(A) any public utility service; or
(B)
any service or facility that provides
communication with any public, private, or
vo unteer entity whose purpose is to respond to fire,
Police, or medical emergencies;
l

Ch. 25

(a) uses force, intimidation, or ariy other form of
violence;
"~

(c) intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys
hs property of another, or

(b)
destroys,
disables,
communication equipment; or

(to recklessly or willfully shoots or propels a
missile or other object at or against a motor vehicle,
US
f " ^ a n e » k°a*» locomotive, train, railway car,
o r cab
°ose, whether moving or standing.

or

damages

(c) commits any other act in an attempt to
prohibit or interrupt the person's use of ""a
communication device to summon emergency aid.
13S

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

on - 199?
" "TITthan $5,000 in
- ^ f W ) 0 b u t . leaa than
toorinexcew
value;
o a n o r tf the actor's conduct

CtaJH,
H.B.W
Paased February 1Lj,.

to or in exces
value; and

1953 aa follow
^Ca-^amendedbyChapUr^La-of

.f t h

items-

7766 6 _ 11

-"-

Utah
1998
Ulahl998
, *^ ,^„ r* f• *W« a* f* c•
j 1- tho updaiurt of the state 1
^ J " d e d
u,
B e U enacted by t
Section 1. Section ^ H 1 - 1 0 6

(1) A p.r»on commit. c n m » pert n:

°

-* ^ n o t a m o u n t u * * " " 0 *

(i) r**l*a.Vy«d*n8W":
(A) human Uf«; <>r
» bumanl-althoraaf^

^

interruption or unpairm
^^pubUcutiUty-rv^o
(B) any -rvic. o r ^ * ^
„
^unic.tton^^oJK.tor-pondtofir..
police, or medical amen-

^

^

M tb-r,
ti2U-*"
*
° ' w i h D O t t or prop.1- *
racU^ry
o r j ^ ^ ^ v a h i d , ,
(d)
car,
m S u e o r o t h e r o b ^ ^ ^
bua, airplane, ^ o - >
**&*
orcabooae, whether
) i t . f . to ny of
(2)(a)AviolationofSub^»
the third degreeM^^fo»4oai«aclaaa
( b ) A v i o U t i o n o f 8 u b ^ o n a K b H ^ a t i o n 0f

Subsection U)0»W»>
„ . . . ^ n i. *
(OAnyotherviolationofth-^^^^
© felony of the • ^ ^ ^

u t 8

pecuniary

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain 142
errors.

actor's

conduct

ADDENDUM B

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IRANhLKlPi uh FL^Uh Pl-BA I L
Second Keadn^ , \ House Bill 49: Januur
ib2

.

" ^

L a w Enforcement & Criming :ustice standing L omii;;:i:e

SPEAKER:

Represent.

- < Biii 49.

U UI j . ; \ 11 \ \

.: rA . .
hairnlan (inaudible]. House Bill 49 was originally
.* ^rk-J ai
i 5'jrth IUM lo kind of clarify some issues with 911. I think
mosi ot us ha\ c always thought or believed that if you dial 911 and tie up
the lines .and do it in a malicious manner, and messing around or whatever,
that it's a fairly heavy penalty. This actually helps to clarify some of those
circumstances under which that would be the case. We would also now
add a couple of items as it relates to other crimes. For example if a person
is committing domestic violence, this would enable the prosecutors
[inaudible] police officers [inaudible] to have a little bit more power in
prosecuting and in bargaining with a perpetrator in regards to also having
that penalty keeping someone from making emergency phone calls. It's
interesting to note [inaudible] received a sheet that shows some of the
needs for this bill. Currently it is a crime to threaten the interruption or
[inaudible] of a public utility service but not actually a line or [inaudible].
What this legislation does is it makes it a class A misdemeanor to disrupt
an emergency services facility by tampering with the property of someone
else. Also it makes it a class B misdemeanor [inaudible] or to falsely
report an emergency knowing that one does not exist, and three, to tamper
with the property of another resulting in recklessly endangering human
health and safety. For example, if you [inaudible] and then someone was
not able to make a call [inaudible]. The people who support this
legislation are the Attorney General's Office, the Statewide Association of
Public Attorneys, and as far as I can determine the police officers do too.
In fact I really don't want to go into too much detail. I think I've kind of
capsulized what it does and I would be open to questions.

Various questions
SPEAKER:

Motion carries unanimously.
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Third Reading of House Bill 49: January 28. 1998
52 Leg., Day 10, Side 1, Counter No. 687
SPEAKER:

[inaudible] consideration of bills on our consent calender.

CLERK:

House Bill 49; Emergency Services Amendments; Brian D. Holladay.
Committee vote: 8 Yes; 0 No; 3 Absent.

SPEAKER:

Representative Holladay.

HOLLADAY:

Thank you Mr. Speaker. We voted on this bill once before but by mistake
it was on the calender a little bit too soon. This just essentially puts
interruption of 911 services for a commission of a crime, domestic
violence, or even for malicious mischief, gives it a little more definition,
and more of a defined crime. I would urge your support.

SPEAKER:

Thank you. Voting is open on House Bill 49.

SPEAKER:

Seeing all present, having voted [inaudible] we'll close the vote. House
Bill 49 averaging 68 Yes votes and 0 No votes passes this body and we
forward it to the Senate for their consideration.
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Second Reading m i u ^ c iiill 15 January 19, 1999
House Judicial'} < on m MIL ./
;

\UAY.

1 hank you Mr. Chairman. 1 his is a ver> simple correction ot a bill
we worked on last year. No one knows for sure [inaudible] bill was
placed back in for writing. Apparently there was a change
[inaudible] on page two, line twenty-eight, violation of subseciu'*
(1 )(b), and then "or (c f was put in there, 1 hat takes that awa\ !
being a more serious offense and being able to assess the dollar
amount shown on the handout that I've given you. We don't really
know where this took place and so we think we can effective!}
blame the computers. It was never designed this wa\ and the
original law was not set up this way. It has the potential of really
limiting the amount of punishment a person can recei\e for a very
serious [inaudible] of the criminal mischief code. So it doesn't really
change anything, nor does it change the intent of an> thing that was
done before With that Tin open to clarifying questions or whatever
you want.

Third Reading of House Bill 15: January 26, iy99
53 Leg., Day 5, Side 1, Counter No 828
CLERK:

House Bill 1 \ Criminal Mischief Amendments; Brian D, I lolladay.
Judiciary ('ommittee vote: 7 Yes; 0 No; 4 Absent.

km

RepresentativeHolladay.

h FR:

HOLLADAY:

Thank you Mr. Speakci. 1 louse Bill 15 was reall} just a mistake in
the numbering of a bill li made certain criminal penalties just a
class A misdemeanor. 1 he Attorney General's Office doesn't want
to take credit for it We're not going to blame our legislative staff.
It's not m> fault. We're just going to blame the computers. But it
was a glitch in the system, and it's a good bill. Please vote for it.

SPEAKER:

Thank \ on Representative Holladay. Voting is now open on House
Bill is"

SPEAKER:

Seeing all present having voted, voting will be closeu. House Bill 15
having received 67 Yes votes and 0 No votes, passes from this body
and will be referred to the Senate for further action.
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